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Abstract: The modern nation state has more or less successfully solved the religious, 
political and socio-ecomomic crises that emerged in modern Europe since the 16th 
Century together with the modern society. Yet, it’s greatest advance, the exclusion of 
inequalities presupposed the exclusion of the internal other of blacks, workers, women 
etc, and the other that stemmed from the non-European world that furthermore was 
under European colonial rule or other forms of European, Northamerican, or Japanese 
imperial control. Yet, the wars and revolutions of the 20th Century let to a complete 
reconstruction, new foundation and globalization of all national and international 
law. The evolutionary advance of the 20th Century was the emergence of world law, 
and this enabled the construction of international and national welfarism. The global 
exclusion of inequalities now has become something like a leading legal principle of 
world law. Nevertheless the dialectic of enlightenment resurged and led to new forms 
of postnational domination, hegemony, oppression and exclusion, and the emergence 
of a new formation of transnational class rule.
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Resumo: O estado-nação moderno resolveu de modo mais ou menos bem-sucedido as 
crises religiosas, políticas e sócio-econômicas que surgiram na Europa moderna desde 
o século 16, juntamente com a sociedade moderna. No entanto, seu maior avanço, a 
exclusão das desigualdades, pressupunha a exclusão do outro interno – os negros, 
trabalhadores, mulheres etc. –, e dos outros descendentes do mundo não-europeu 
que, além disso, estava sob domínio colonial europeu ou de outras formas de controle 
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imperial europeu, norte-americano ou japonês. No entanto, as guerras e revoluções do 
século 20 levaram a uma completa reconstrução, a uma nova fundação e globalização 
de todas as leis nacionais e internacionais. O avanço evolutivo do século 20 foi o 
surgimento do direito mundial, e isso possibilitou a construção do bem-estar (welfarism) 
nacional e internacional. A exclusão global das desigualdades agora tornou-se algo 
como um princípio orientador jurídico do direito mundial. No entanto, a Dialética do 
Esclarecimento voltou novamente e levou a novas formas de dominação pós-nacional, 
a hegemonia, opressão e exclusão, e à emergência de uma nova formação da dominação 
de classe transnacional.
Palavras-chave:  Crise;  Exclusão  de  desigualdades;  Sociedade  mundial;  Direito  mundial; 
Revolução legal global
After a brief recollection of the advances of the modern nation state (1) 
I will turn to the dark side of the history of that state (2). Whereas the greatest 
advance of the (Western) democratic nation state was the exclusion of national 
inequalities but at the price of the construction of an international law of formal 
inequality between (civilized) and (non-civilized) nations, it was precisely this 
distinction that vanished during the massive transformations of national and 
international law after 1945, and the emergence of a world society (3). The deep 
change of 1945 that divides the whole Century could be called revolutionary 
without exaggeration, and it was a legal revolution (4). Yet, in the last chapter 
we have to face the return of the dialectic of enlightenment in the juridified and 
even partly constitutionalized but not democratized world society (5).
1
The  subjective  spirit  of  the  revolutions  of  the  eighteenth  century 
became objective spirit for the first time within the borders of the modern 
nation state. This state always had many faces: the Arendtian face of violence, 
the  Habermasian  face  of  administrative  power,  the  Foucaultian  face  of 
surveillance and punishment, the faces of imperialism, colonialism, war-on-
terror, and so on (Arendt, 1973; Habermas, 1984).1 However, the nation state, 
1  This is a complex argument and needs some explanation. So, Arendt opposes power and 
violence (in German: Gewalt) and argues that law is concerned with power not violence 
or force. But this makes no sense because there is no power which is not backed by force 
as its ‘symbiotic mechanism’. Therefore Habermas, who has taken up Arendt’s concept of 
power, confronted it not to force or violence but to administrative power, calling Arendt’s 
concept of power now communicative power. Communicative power in particular is backed 
by revolutionary violence which Habermas calls the power (violence) of revenge (in German: 
rächende Gewalt). Arendt seeks explicitly to separate power from force and violence but 
implicitly refers to a power which is backed by revolutionary violence simply because her 
paradigm case of power is revolution, and she never argued for something like resistance 
without violence. See: Arendt (1973); Habermas (1984).155     H. Brunkhorst – Democracy under pressure
once it became democratized, possessed not only the administrative power 
of oppression and control, but at the same time the administrative power to 
exclude inequality with respect to individual rights, political participation, 
and equal access to social welfare and opportunities (Marshall, 1992, p. 52; 
Stichweh, 2000). Only the modern nation state had (and still has) not only 
the normative idea, but also the administrative power to achieve that. Up to 
the present all advances in the reluctant inclusion of the other, and so also all 
advances of cosmopolitanism, are to a greater or lesser degree advances that 
have been accomplished by the modern nation state. National constitutional 
regimes have solved the three basic conflicts and crises of the modern capitalist 
and functionally differentiated society.
•  First, the nation state has solved the motivational crisis that caused a long 
period of religious civil wars nearly all over Europe, and was sparked by 
the Protestant Revolutions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; this 
has  been  achieved  through  the  constitutional  institutionalization  of  the 
conflicts  between  different  religious,  agnostic,  and  anti-religious  world 
views (Habermas, 1975).2 This was the result of a two-step development, 
accomplished  in  a  manner  that  was  both  functionally  and  normatively 
universal. On the one hand, the functional effect of the formation of a 
territorial system of states transformed the uncontrolled explosion of religious 
freedom into a controlled chain reaction that kept the productive forces of 
religious fundamentalism alive and its destructive forces (to some degree) 
under control (Weber, 1920). This was initially the repressive effect of the 
confessionalization of the territorial state which for a long time wrongly was 
called ‘secularization’ (Reinhard, 1999; Schilling, 1999; Dreier, 2001, p. 133-
169; Stolleis, 1993). On the other hand, the long and reluctant process of 
democratization of the nation state replaced repressive confessionalization 
by emancipatory legislation which ultimately led to the implementation of 
the equal freedom of religion together with the equal freedom from religious 
and other belief systems (Parsons, 1972).
•  Second, the emerging nation state also solved the legitimacy crisis of the 
public  sphere,  of  public  law,  and  public  power,  which  marked  the  old 
European Ancien Regime and culminated in the constitutional revolutions 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Constitutions have transformed 
antagonistic class struggles into agonistic political struggles between political 
parties, unions and entrepreneurs, civic associations, etc. (Mouffe, 2000).3 
In the more successful processes of Western history, bloody constitutional 
revolutions turned into permanent and legal revolutions (Habermas, 1989, 
p. 7-36). Once again, the effect was twofold, accompanied on all its steps 
by the shadow of the dialectic of enlightenment. It led, on the one hand, to a 
functional transformation of the destructive and oppressive potential of a highly 
2  On the distinction of different types of crises (motivational, legitimization, etc.) see: Habermas 
(1975).
3  For the distinction between antagonism and agonism see: Mouffe (2000).156   Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 10, n. 1, p. 153-171, jan.-abr. 2010
specialized politics of power accumulation for its own sake into a more or less 
controlled explosion of all the productive forces of administrative, discursive 
and disciplinary state-power (Lüdtke, 1980, p. 470-491; Foucault, 1979; 
Luhmann, 1990, 176-220).4 This, in turn, was accompanied by democratic 
emancipatory legislation, which finally brought about the implementation of 
the freedom of public power together with the freedom from public power.
•  Thirdly, the nation state also solved the social class conflicts in the social 
revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It accomplished this 
through the emergence of a regulatory social welfare state, which transformed 
the  elitist  bourgeois  parliamentarianism  of  the  nineteenth  century  into 
egalitarian mass democracy. The social class struggle did not vanish but was 
institutionalized (Hoss, 1972), and the violent social revolution became at its 
core a legally organized ‘educational revolution’ (Parsons; Platt, 1990). In this 
respect, it was the great functional advance of social democracy to keep most 
of the productive forces and to get rid to some degree of the destructive forces 
of the exploding free markets of money, real estate, and labour (Polanyi, 
1997). It achieved this by overcoming the fundamentalist bourgeois dualism 
of private and public law (Kelsen, 1967a, 1967b). In the first decades of 
social welfare regimes, this was more or less the merit of administrative law 
and bureaucratic rule in a regime of low-intense democracy (Marks, 2000). 
The dialectic of enlightenment here led to Adornos “administrated world” 
(verwaltete Welt) of lucky slaves. Yet, it was not a slave-holders society, 
but based on democratic institutions and rule of law. Therefore, and only 
therefore an ongoing democratic rights revolution was feasible, which was 
performed by social movements, and directed against low-intense democracy. 
It finally led to the implementation of the freedom of markets together with 
the freedom from markets. This transformed the system of individual rights 
based on the freedom of property into a comprehensive system of welfare and 
anti-discrimination norms (Berman, 1963; Somek, 2008).
Despite this, however, the impressive normative and functional advances 
of the Western democratic nation state were obtained at the price of the 
cosmopolitan claims of the French Revolution. These claims were internal to 
the Enlightenment, the intellectual basis and the source of the directing ideas 
of the law of the constitutional revolutions in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. For a long time, they were at best soft law but expressed 
in important legal documents (even if without legal force) like the American 
Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of Rights. Once it 
came to concretize them in ordinary legislation, the universality inherent in 
the spirit of the equal rights of citizens vanished and was combined with an 
unequal status of the others – women, workers, non-Europeans. Yet this did not 
mean that they were forgotten; on the contrary, as Kant had rightly observed, 
4  In this respect three very different approaches (one historical, one power-theoretical, and the 
third from system theory) are in agreement. See: Lüdtke(1980, p. 470-491); Foucault (1979); 
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their claims for equal treatment stayed alive and their communicative power 
grew in the course of history until they were implemented by binding decisions 
at least partially, but step by step.
2
Until 1945, the modern nation state was the state of the regional societies 
of Europe, America, and Japan. The rest of the world was either under the 
imperial control of these states or kept outside the system of nation states. 
Until the mid-twentieth century, the ‘exclusion of inequality’ meant equality 
for the citizens of the state and inequality for those who did not belong to the 
regional system of states. There was not even any serious demand for a global 
exclusion of inequality.
When Kant proposed the ‘cosmopolitan condition’ of linking nations 
together on the grounds that in modern times ‘a violation of rights in one 
part  of  the  world  is  felt  everywhere’  (Kant,  1996),  his  notion  of  world 
(concerning the political world in contrast to the globe, which for Kant was 
only a transcendental scheme) was more or less reduced to Europe and the 
European system of states. Also Hegel’s claim of the ‘infinite importance’ that 
‘a human being counts as such because he is a human being, not because he 
is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc.’ (Hegel, 1991, § 209) is 
relativised by his reductionist understanding of the legal meaning of human 
rights as applicable to male citizens, biblical religions, and European nations 
only. He also explicitly limits human rights to national civil law (of the 
bürgerliche Gesellschaft and its lex mercatoria), and this law loses its validity 
when confronted with the essential concerns of the executive administration of 
the state and its particular relations of power (besondere Gewaltverhältnisse, 
justizfreie Hoheitsakte). Hegel therefore condemns any ‘cosmopolitanism’ that 
is opposed to the concrete ethical practices (Sittlichkeit) of the state.
Some  decades  later,  when  Johann  Caspar  Bluntschli  declared  the 
implementation of a ‘human world order’ (menschliche Weltordnung) to be the 
main end of international law, he neither saw any contradiction between this 
noble aim and his (and his colleagues’) identification of the modern state with 
a male dominated civilization (Bluntschli apud Koskenniemi, 2001, p. 80) 
nor with his at least latently racist thesis that all law is Aryan (arisch) (ibid., 
p. 77). The liberal cosmopolitanism of the ‘men of 1873’ (who founded the 
Institut de Droit International and invented a cosmopolitan international 
law as a new legal discipline) was completely Eurocentric, relying on the 
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people (Bermann, 1998, p. 117-140; Anghie, 2004). The generous tolerance 
of the men of 1873 was paternalistic and repressive from its very beginning. 
Hence, it is no surprise that the liberal cosmopolitan humanists who wanted to 
found a human world order soon became apologists of imperialism, defending 
King Leopold’s private-prerogative state (Ernst Fraenkel’s Maßnahmestaat) in 
the ‘heart of darkness’ by drawing a distinction between club members on the 
one side and outlaws on the other (Koskenniemi, 2001, p. 168-169). Following 
this line of argument, Article 35 of the Berlin Conference on the future of Africa 
(1884-5) offers ‘jurisdiction’ for the civilized nations of Europe and ‘authority’ 
for those in the heart of darkness (ibid., p. 126). The global world order during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a universal Doppelstaat (dual 
state) (Fraenkel, 1999). Guantanamo has a long history.
Let me add a brief remark on the ambivalent use of notions as “civilization” 
or “civilized nations”. Critical Legal as well as Post-Colonial Studies rightly 
criticized the Western-centric and imperial use of the notion of “civilization” 
(Bermann, 1998, p. 117-140).5 This is most obvious in the Declaration of 
Independence where the “civilized nations” already bridge the gap between 
the individual natural law, or human right that “all men are created equal”, and 
the collective exception of the “merciless Indian Savages” who are prepared 
for extermination by introducing them as international public enemies who 
are beyond all “standards of civilized nations”, hence excluded from human 
rights protection and humanity as such. Deconstructionists, Post-Colonialists 
and others rightly have drawn a dark and bloody track that reaches from the 
original Spanish and Portuguese treatment of the Indians end of the 15th Century 
to the rough states and listed terror suspects of our days (Anghie, 2004). But 
even “standards of civilized nations” as legal standards have a Janus-face 
(Habermas). Now, the US-Supreme Court Justice Breyer (and the majority of 
the Court) uses just that phrase from the Declaration of Independence to open 
the US-constitutional law for the internalization of international law, inter 
alia with the aim to include terror suspects and others as subjects of human 
rights application, and against the parochial and far right interpretation of the 
Constitution by Scalia (Nickel, 2009, p. 281-306).
3
Since  1945,  however,  colonialism  and  classical  imperialism  have 
vanished (Hardt; Negri, 2001; Fischer-Lescano; Teubner, 2005; Buckel, 2007; 
5  Instead of all others: Bermann (1998, p. 117-140).159     H. Brunkhorst – Democracy under pressure
Chimni, 2004, p. 1-37), and Eurocentrism has become decentred (Brunkhorst, 
2005). Western rationalism, functional differentiation, legal formalism, and 
moral universalism are no longer specifically Western phenomena. The deep 
structural and conceptual change that this decentring of Eurocentrism has 
brought about is not yet sufficiently understood. For good or ill, everybody 
today must conduct his or her life under the more or less brutal conditions of 
the selective and disciplinary machinery of markets, schools, kindergartens, 
universities, lifelong learning, traffic rules, and ‘total institutions’ (Goffman) 
such as jails, hospitals, or military barracks.
At the same time, state sovereignty was equalised as the state went global. 
The last square metre of the globe became state territory (at least legally) 
(Oeter, 2008, p. 90-114), and even the moon became an object of international 
treaties between states (Dobner, 2002). Together with the globalisation of the 
modern constitutional nation state, therefore, all functional subsystems, which 
from the sixteenth century until 1945 were bound to state power and to the 
international order of the regional societies of Europe, America, and Japan, 
became global systems.
Sociologists rightly and successfully have criticized the ‘methodological 
nationalism’ of their own discipline (Beck, 2002), and have started to replace 
the pluralism of national societies by the singular concept of a ‘global social 
system’ or a ‘world society’ which includes all communications (Luhmann, 
1971, p. 1-34; 1997, p. 145-146), which is normatively integrated (Parsons, 
1961, p. 120-129; Stichweh, 2004, p. 236-245), and which has transformed 
all political, legal, economic, cultural, functional, and geopolitical differences 
into internal differences of the one and only world society. These differences 
now depend entirely on the fundamental societal structure of the world society 
and its cultural constituents (Meyer, 1997, p. 144-181; 2005).
Whereas the function of the basic structure primarily is selective and 
constraining, the function of the superstructure of the global secular culture 
(or the background of global knowledge, the global Lebenswelt) is shaping and 
constituting for the behaviour and the subjectivity of everybody everywhere on 
the globe. Everybody, whether they want it or not, is shaped by the individualism 
and rationality of a single global culture which includes human rights culture 
as well as the culture of individualized suicide bombing (Rorty, 1993, p. 111-
120; Roy, 2006). All cultural differences are now of the same society, and of 
individualized persons who have to organize and reorganize, construct and 
reconstruct their ego and their personal and collective identity lifelong, and 
in order to do that they must rely on the (weak or strong) means of their own 
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as ‘free men’ we are not looking with Sartre into the abyss of nothingness, 
but are acting against a dense and common background of relatively abstract, 
highly general and formal, thoroughly secular, nevertheless substantial global 
knowledge that is implicit in the global social life-world. This is so simply 
because traditional identity formations no longer and nowhere are available 
without a permanently growing and changing variety of alternative offers, in 
Teheran as well as in New York, in the Alps of Switzerland as well as in the 
mountain regions of Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Tibet (Parsons; Platt, 1990; 
Döbert; Habermas; Nunner-Winkler, 1980).
These developments are now reflected more and more by the scientific 
superstructure, not only in social sciences but also in history and philosophy. 
For over twenty years we have been observing a strong turn in history from 
national  to  European  and  world  history;  in  philosophy  Kant’s  essay  on 
perpetual peace is suddenly no longer a marginal subject. Even jurists have 
now started to develop Hans Kelsen’s insight from the 1920s that there is 
no dualist gap between national and international law, but only a continuum 
(Brunkhorst, 2008, p. 30-63). In the last decade, there has been a mushrooming 
of national-international hybrids and new branches of legal disciplines such as 
transnational administrative law.
4
The twentieth century strikingly has been called an ‘age of extremes’ 
(Hobsbawm, 1994), and every attempt to bridge the abyss that separates these 
extremes would be an ‘extorted reconciliation’ (Adorno, 1974, p. 251-280). 
This century was the catastrophe that has incurably ‘damaged life’ (Adorno, 
1951). But it was also the century of a great legal revolution which transformed 
not only law but society as a whole; a revolution that had its deep roots 
in the workers movement of the 19th and 20th Centuries; a revolution that 
triggered experimental-communicative productivity in new social and cultural 
practices, political and legal institutions, and scientific and philosophical 
discourse.
If  we  call  the  twentieth  century  the  totalitarian  century,  then  this 
is at the same time right and wrong. After disastrous revolutionary and 
counterrevolutionary worldwide wars, after battles for material and battles 
of attrition, bombing wars and civil wars, pogroms, genocides, concentration 
and death camps, national uprisings, racist excesses, terrorism and counter-
terrorism, the destruction and founding of states and fascist, socialist and – not 
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but the loser. In particular, the World Wars were fought by their winners not 
only for national interest alone, but also for democracy, global peace, and 
human rights.
The twentieth century was not only the century of state-organized mass 
terror (which could not, on this scale, have been organized any other way than 
by state) (Reinhard, 1999). It was also the century of ground-shaking normative 
progress, through which democracy was universalized and constitutional law 
transformed into global constitutionalism, national human rights into global 
civil rights, constitutional state sovereignty into democratic sovereignty, and 
the bourgeois state into a social welfare state. Between Europeans and non-
Europeans there has existed for hundreds of years the formal and legal unequal 
distribution of rights: jurisdiction for us, authority for the others.6 Now, for the 
first time in history, rights are formally equal. Admittedly, the massive human-
rights violations, social exclusion and outrageous, unequal treatment of entire 
world regions have not disappeared. But human-rights violations, lawlessness, 
and political and social disparity are now for the first time considered to be our 
common problem – a problem that concerns every single actor in this global 
society. Only now are there serious and legally binding claims to the global 
(and not any longer just national) exclusion of inequality.
The world law and the human rights culture of the late twentieth century 
was not only the result of the negative insight from 1945 that Auschwitz and 
war (which both deeply hanged together) should happen never again. It was 
also the positive result of a great and successful legal revolution, which began 
at the end of the First World War with the tragic Russian Revolution and the 
American intervention in the war in 1917, and was fought for progressive, 
new, and supposedly more inclusive rights, and more and expanded individual 
and political freedom (Brunkhorst, 2008, p. 9-34). In 1917 President Wilson 
forced the reluctant Western allies to claim revolutionary war objectives, and 
from this moment the war (and later the Second World War, again as a result of 
American intervention) was fought, not only for self-preservation and national 
interest, but also for global democracy and peace: ‘To make the world safe 
for democracy’ (Wilson). The leader of the Russian Revolution, Lenin who 
was a quasi-religious, Marxist and Atheist believer and the Calvinist-Kantian 
American President Wilson who believed in the social gospel and God’s 
personal mandate, both recognized the First World War – from very different 
perspectives – as the beginning of a global revolution and as a revolutionary 
war against war.
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Lenin and Wilson were both fierce opponents of the then still powerful 
monarchies  and  the  existing  pluralism  of  monarchist  and  democratic, 
imperialistic, federate, and nationalistic constitutional regimes. This negative 
objective was achieved first: constitutional monarchy – reinvented in every 
new, great revolution since the pontifical revolution of the twelfth century – 
was so thoroughly abolished that hardly anyone remembers it today (Kelsen, 
2006, p. 51).7
While  Wilson  wanted  to  transform  international  law  according  to 
Kant’s plan and unite the nations in a great federation of democratic nations 
(Beestermöller, 1995; Eberl, 2008), Lenin was trying to revolutionize social 
conditions and build up a socialist and Soviet world empire. The Treaty of 
Versailles and the concomitant founding of the League of Nations were events 
as revolutionary as the Russian Revolution (Kelsen, 1981; Verdross, 1926). 
While the success of the October Revolution made the drastic reform of 
property law in an entire world region possible and subsumed the legal system 
under socio-political and socio-pedagogical goals, the Treaty of Versailles 
and the ‘Covenant of the League of Nations [supplanted] the ius publicum 
europaeum’ (Eberl, 2008). 
Russia and America – the two sides of this revolutionary pincer movement 
that laid siege to Europe and put pressure on its centre – were brothers hostile 
to each other from the beginning, but who had to respond to each other in a 
mutually beneficial manner. The West felt compelled to turn the attack on 
property law and the powerful, global, and social-revolutionary impulse of the 
Russian Revolution, reinforced strongly by their respective domestic workers 
movements, into a ‘peaceful revolution’, and thus opened a way towards 
socialism that conformed to constitutionality.
At the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union had to get on 
board with international politics, found the United Nations together with 
the United States, their European allies and some representatives of the then 
emerging later so-called Third World. From this time on, the Soviet Union was 
in the web of international law and human rights. Up until the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation (CSCE) they had to sign human rights declarations 
that helped to make it implode in the end.8 The radical changes in the twentieth 
7  ‘Der alte Offizier konnte es bis zum letzten Augenblick (...) nicht für möglich halten, dass 
ein vielhundertjähriges Reich einfach vom Schauplatz der Geschichte verschwinden könne’ 
(Kelsen, 2006, p. 51).
8  This, of course, was accompanied by other developments, in particular the much better working 
functional differentiation in Western democracies and their higher reflexive capacity to observe 
themselves together with the particular blindness of the socialist countries to produce adequate 
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century led to variants of the same legal reforms – pre-constitutional and 
pseudo-democratic in the East, democratic-constitutional in the West (Berman, 
2006, p. 16-17).
•  These radical changes repealed the bourgeois centering of equality rights 
around property and turned these rights into a comprehensive system of 
anti-discrimination norms (Sunstein, 1993). Franklin D. Roosevelt’s famous 
‘Second Bill of Rights’ from January 1944 was the beginning of a ‘rights 
revolution’ whose waves of anti-discrimination legislation continued into the 
1970s and 1980s, extending rights of equality to other spheres. In his address 
to Congress, Roosevelt declared the existing ‘inalienable political rights’ of 
the constitution to be valid but insufficient for dealing with a complex society. 
Rather, he stated, we need to ensure ‘equality in the pursuit of happiness’ 
within this society through social rights. Although mentioning ‘free speech’, 
‘free press’, ‘free worship’, ‘trial by jury’, and ‘freedom from unreasonable 
searches and seizure’, he did not refer at all to property rights, an absence that 
is the most significant aspect of the text. 
•  The revolutionary reforms that were from the very beginning global, further 
changed the legislation from conditional to final programming (Grimm, 1990, 
1991, p. 159-175; Luhmann, 1981; Neumann, 1937, p. 542-596), developed 
a comprehensive administrative planning law (tried and tested in the World 
Wars) (Seagle, 1951; Maurer, 2009), and introduced a new system of regulative 
family, socialisation, and conduct law. To adopt Luhmann’s phrase, one could 
call it ‘alteration of persons’ law’ (Personenänderungsrecht); Berman, by 
contrast, speaks (in the language of Soviet law) of ‘parental law’ and of a 
‘nurturing’ or ‘educational role of law’; and with Foucault one could speak 
of the law of discourse police and bio-power (Luhmann, 1981; Berman, 1963; 
Joerges; Ghaleigh, 2003).
•  The legal revolution ended in 1945 with the constitution of the United Nations 
in San Francisco. A new system of basic human rights norms, coupled with 
a completely new system of inter-, trans-, and supranational institutions 
was created during the short period from 1941 to 1951. This system in fact 
included international welfarism, which was invented before the great triumph 
of national welfare states (Leisering, 2007, p. 185-205).
International law has changed deeply since the revolutionary founding of 
the United Nations. It has witnessed a turn from a law of coexisting states to 
a law of cooperation (Bast, 2009, p. 185-193), the founding of the European 
Union, the Human Rights Treaties from the 1960s, the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of the Treaties, and the emergence of international ius cogens, 
etc. The old rule of equal sovereignty of states became ‘sovereign equality’ 
under international law (Art. 2 prop. 1 UN Charter); individual human beings 
(in the good and in the bad) became subject to International Law; democracy 
became an emerging right or a legal principle that can also be enforced against 
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in the 1940s, is now a legal norm that binds the international community 
(Brunkhorst, 2005).9 All these legal rules are regularly broken. However, this is 
not a specific feature of international law; it happens with national law as well, 
which to a considerable degree is also soft, symbolic, or dead law. What is new 
today is that international and cosmopolitan equal rights have become binding 
legal norms, and as such they have to be taken seriously. There is no longer any 
space for any action outside the law or outside the legal system (Byers, 2003, 
p. 171-190). Every single action of every kind of actor, individuals, states, and 
organisations is either legal or illegal – tertium non datur. In consequence, the 
difference in principle between national and international law has vanished, a 
point that Hans Kelsen, Alfred Verdross and other cosmopolitan international 
lawyers were already claiming during the First World War.
5
The legal, political and economic world order today is a juridified or 
constitutionalized order. But the global constitutional system is in bad shape. 
There exist now, on the one hand, the basic legal principles of the global 
inclusion of the other and the global exclusion of inequality. Yet on the other 
hand there exist global functional systems, global actors and global spheres of 
value, which emerge with great rapidity, and which tear themselves off from 
the constitutional bonds of the nation state. This is a double-edged process 
that has caused a new dialectic of Enlightenment. The most dramatic effect of 
this process of the formation of the global society is the decline of the ability 
of the nation state to exclude inequalities effectively – even within the highly 
privileged OECD-world. This has three very significant consequences.
These consequences are observable, 
•  first of all, in the economic system. In this respect, we can observe the complete 
transformation of the state-embedded markets of regional late capitalism into 
the market-embedded states of global Turbo-capitalism (Streek, 2005).10 The 
negative effect of economic globalization on our rights is that the freedom 
of markets explodes globally, and again at the cost of the freedom from the 
negative externalities of disembedded markets, and it is combined with 
9  For a more comprehensive overview cf Brunkhorst (2008, p. 9-34).
10  Wolfgang Streek, “Sectoral specialization: politics and the nation state in a global economy”, 
paper presented on the 37th World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, 
Stockholm 2005. As we now can see, the talk about late capitalism was not wrong but should 
be restricted to state-embedded capitalism, and state embedded capitalism indeed is over. But 
what then came was not socialism but global disembedded capitalism which seems to be as far 
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heavy, sometimes war-like competition, and to be sure, this will be reinforced 
strongly by the present economic crisis: There will be blood.11 
•  Surprisingly enough, in questions regarding the religious sphere of values we 
can make a similar observation and identify similar consequences. Global 
society makes the proposition that is true for the capitalist economy equally 
true for the autonomous development of the religious sphere of values. In 
consequence, second, we are now confronted with the transformation of 
the state-embedded religions of Western regional society into the religion-
embedded states of the global society. Since the 1970s, religious communities 
have crossed borders and have been able to escape from state control. Again 
the negative effect of this on our rights is that the freedom of religions explodes 
whereas the freedom from religion comes under pressure. At the same time 
the fragmented legal and administrational means of states, inter-, trans- and 
supranational organizations seems not to be sufficient to get the unleashed 
destructive potential of religious fundamentalism under control: There will 
be Blood.
•  Last but not least the (internally fragmented) executive branches of state-power 
have decoupled themselves from the state-based separation, coordination and 
unification of powers under the democratic rule of law, and they too have 
gone global (Tietje, 2003, p. 1081-1164; Möllers, 2005, p. 351-389; Krisch; 
Kingsbury, 2006; Möllers; Voßkuhle; Walter, 2007; Fischer-Lescano, 2008, 
p. 373-383; Wolf, 2000; Lübbe-Wolf, 2009; Dobner, 2006).12 As a result 
of this, the new globalized executive power seems to be undergoing the 
same transformation as markets and religious belief systems, and it is thus 
transformed, third, from state-embedded power to power-embedded states. 
This leads to a new and now global privileging of the always more flexible 
second branch of power vis-à-vis the first and third one, which jeopardizes 
the  achievements  of  the  modern  constitutional  state  (Wolf,  2000).  The 
effect of this is an accelerating process of a global original accumulation 
of power beyond national and representative government. Instead of global 
democratic government we now are approaching some kind of directorial 
global bonapartist governance: that is, soft bonapartist governance for us of 
the North West, and hard bonapartist governance for them of the South East, 
the failed and outlaw states and regions of the globe (Anghie, 2004): There 
will be blood.
The deep division of the contemporary world into two classes of people – 
that is, into people with good passports and people with bad passports (Calhoun, 
2002, p. 869-897; 2003, p. 531-553; 2005) – is mirrored by the constitutional 
11  There will be blood, USA 2007, Director: Paul Thomas Anderson. One-sided but in this point 
striking the neo-Pashukanian analysis of international law by China Mieville (2005).
12  On transnational administrative during the last few years a whole industry of research emerged, 
see only: Tietje (2003, p. 1081-1164); Möllers (2005, p. 351-389); Krisch and Kingsbury 
(2006); Kingsbury; Krisch; Steward (2005). Möllers; Voßkuhle; Walter (orgs.) (2007); Fischer-
Lescano (2008, p. 373-383). On the globalization of executive power: Wolf (2000); Dobner 
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structure of the world society. Today there already exists, a certain kind of 
global constitutionalism, which is one of the lasting results of the revolutionary 
change that began in the 1940s (and observed as ‘constitutionalism’ already by 
Talcott Parsons in 1960, a sociologist who never was under suspicion to be an 
idealist (Parsons, 1961). However, the existing global constitutional regime is 
far removed from being democratic (Fassbender, 1998, p. 529-619; Bogdandy, 
2003; Albert; Stichweh, 2007; Bogdandy, 2006, p. 223-242; Brunkhorst, 
2002, p. 675-690; Brunkhorst, 2005, p. 330-348; Teubner, 2003, p. 1-28).13 
All post-national constitutional regimes are characterized by a disproportion 
between legal declarations of egalitarian rights and democracy and its legal 
implementation by the international constitutional law of check and balances 
(Brunkhorst, 2002, 2005).14 Hence, the legal revolution of the 20th Century was 
successful, but it was unfinished. This is so because the one or many global 
constitutions are based on a constitutional compromise (Franz Neumann) that 
mirrors the hegemonic power structure and the new relations of domination 
in the world society; and it is far from sure, that global constitutionalism is 
already in a shape to enable the legal fight for law within the law. But this 
is the only hope left in a time of global crisis and no social movement that 
can take the chance of crisis, and change the world in a way as the last great 
social movement of world history could do and did, the workers movement 
which withered away at the threshold of the 21s Century and was replaced 
by a Multitude which has no longer any meaning for the reproduction of 
modern global capitalism. But, may be, the deep structural transformations 
of the world society which we witness in the 21s Century will give birth to a 
new and powerful social movement of emancipation. Yet, this is completely 
unpredictable and beyond social science.
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